Quantum Murmurations
Terry Steans (former Head of Global Investigations at FIFA: "I worked inside FIFA investigating match fixing... I've watched the growth of Sportradar ever since Chris Eaton the former head of FIFA security started to push them into football associations. I could never reconcile how my fixing sources were telling me matches were fixed and yet Sportradar saw nothing. Moreover could not share information with us due to client confidentiality"
Most football fans are completely clueless when it comes to understanding the mechanisms underpinning their beloved sport - even as fans finally grasp reality and discuss whether matchfixing ever occurs in the UK, professional traders in the Philippines forced Wigan Athletic into administration and relegation from the Championship over a bet!
The FA Cup winners of 2013 were undermined by SE Asian pro gamblers who treated the club merely as a poker chip of middling value.
The history doesn't matter.
The town doesn't matter.
Betting market control matters.
When we first started to analyse football markets in the mid-nineties (we had previously exposed corruption in British horserace betting markets), we noticed a clear differential between the two sports.
In horseracing, the market was everything and outcomes were determined by money flows on the rails and liability imbalances in the betting offices - whether Toby Balding's 4/7 favourite was going to win the race depended only minimally on the quality of the horse and jockey.
It depended far more on conspicuous money flows.
In football at that time, the situation was entirely different.
Configurative sub-models and parameter analytics secured market advantage as not only was all the fundamental information not in the price but also there were very few rogue entities corrupting the sport.
Horseracing could have been described as a mature market where codified information was tic tacked into the price and unknown unknowns were not known to be impactful as black swan outliers were squashed down by the internalised weight of the systemic corruption.
The race outcomes were revealed to outsiders and investigators by market analytics - knowing when a favourite was being set up to lose and short-selling that reality by laying the beast was a valid trading strategy.
In 1995, football matches were decided by proper inputs - good training leading to improved fitness, creative windows of over-performance, player ability, home advantage differentials, pitch dimensions, formations, goalkeeper quality and integration with the defence, managerial strategy, internal morale evaluation etc etc.
Accurate market pricing was based on creative integration of the weighted summation of these fundamental parameters.
Very few market participants were ahead of the market in their pricing - the first European to find valuable nuggets in the SE Asian underground was Brighton and Hove Albion owner Tony Bloom (while he was working for Victor Chandler). This array of market makers in the SE Asian underground was pricing up European football matches more accurately than the Europeans who enjoyed far closer cultural and geographical ties to the leagues.
And the market control generated profits that markedly inflated over time due to increased betting volume and the robustness of the criminal entities corrupting the football.
Mister Big from 1995 is Mr Well Fucking Bigger in 2023.
Question: What were these SE Asian operators accessing that was invisible to the rest of the market?
Answer: Privileged inside information.
Once mutually beneficial links were established between Europe and the Far East, the greed merchants in Europe could link with markets where £1 million bets were commonplace and achieve access to real-time underground market prices where the matchfixing monies always surfaced sometime somewhere before kick off.
That was the end of football.
Right here.
Right now.
Right there.
Right then.
For nearly three decades, there has been a steady and accelerating progression from games being decided by skill, player overperformance and fitness to games being decided by matchfixing, player underperformance and doping.
Although we are not present when plans are made to fix an event, we are able to decipher the markets and undertake fraud forensics of the betting markets as well as making good use of the visuals of the corruption - a non-trying goalkeeper is far easier to detect than a non-whipping jockey.
The dark pool underground markets where the major entities roll is where the football matches are really played.
And the competitive trading at dark pool level is much more exciting than the resultant compromised sporting event - the outcome is uncertain and the control and coercion may still be switched to on or off depending on circumstance.
Unknowns effervesce into knowns.
By the time the match kicks off, everything is known.
Since Bloom slithered into Thailand, the battle between SE Asian and European bookmakers has been the backdrop to all those peculiar results in the Premier League - that most volatile of sporting entities.
In a very simplified form, we could analyse the warfare as SE Asian analytical and strategic advantage versus European cultural and geographic edge, but these two moulds merged and evolved into the combinational fragmented cartel that forms the template for today's systemic corruption in the EPL.
Football has now finally caught up with where horseracing was in 1995.
It's not a pretty sight, particularly during the pandemic with no fans, no atmosphere due to ludicrous spectacle of fan soundtrack, just betting advertisements persuading punters where to randomly bet on the fake surreal exposition that is taking place (with suitable time lag) on their screens.
Anybody who bets or trades on the markets in this day and age has to have serious market analytical skills.
Otherwise you are going to lose money.
Potentially lots of it if you fall repeatedly into any of the many traps that the bookmakers and their accomplices in the media set for you, day after day.
There are, in essence, two aims to this book that we are publishing.
Firstly, to expose and analyse the systemic corruption that has destroyed British football and, secondly, to educate the reader in the analytics of markets.
So there will be sections in the book where we focus on how we are able to prove that football is indeed fixed to the extent that we claim and how to evaluate games professionally and how to profit from such matchfixing.
Humans approach uncertainty with two weapons - intuition and analytics.
In corrupt markets, unrefined intuition alone is only marginally better than reading the I-Ching.
It is in bespoke analytics that you gain market advantage.
And there is a grand old feedback loop at large here - the more that analytics enables an observer to perceive a true hologram of global corruption in a sector, the more the intuition of that observer is trained up for future corruption evaluations within that hologram.
The analysis and gut feeling based on experience strips out value from the white noise becoming a dark pool edge in the process.
But markets are never static.
We can describe to you today's corruptions and yesterday's too but tomorrow's are something else.
And here is one of the major differentials between football in 1995 and football in 2023 - in 1995, I would be very confident of a forthcoming match due to proprietary analytical inputs that suggested that the betting markets were mispriced and inefficient to my advantage.
Only the most contrived counter-intuitive events fall into this category nowadays - the control of outcome is an ongoing spectacle of impossible exchange right up to the hour before kick off when hedging becomes dominant as realisation hits home for those outside the loop.
The essential factor in trading (as in war) is human.
Markets may be regarded as functions of both economic and psychological mechanisms and, as the markets mature and become more systemically rogue, the psychological element overwhelms the economic. Indeed, some mature markets may be traded almost entirely using psychological inputs - counter-intuitive trading against the masses is a good starting point for bank building.
Market wisdom depends on experience and sagacity, enlightened vigour and a brave almost supernatural comprehension of the battlefield. One acts while contemporaries sleep - vigilance must be perpetual. Profit is the object.
Successful trading has strength, nerves and a soul - it is the transparent conglomeration of an opaque reality.
A rogue state craves war in every feasible location.
The UK has become like Prussia - military organisation conducted by a military corporation.
Fritz Hoenig: "... the best strategy cannot produce good results if tactics are at fault."
The correct mode of trading strategy is not improvised and reactively intuitive - it is already established and asserts market edge proactively. One needs to maintain a microscopic, solid, conscious belief in the analytics that one carries into the competitive marketplace.
In mature betting markets, traders frequently must consider taking market positions that are contrary to the perceived wisdom and to gut feeling. It takes a certain courage and a beautifully crafted holistic overview to allow the domination of analytics over instinct.
Trading rules are critical.
There must be thresholds for both trading activation and isolationism..
Filtrations are a given.
Competitive corruption may only be solved via a flexible evolving oversight of all the valid and invalid inputs.
Hence a successful professional trader is equivalent to a successful military general.
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I-Security Document: 20 Years Of The Infamous Wu Shu Hackers - Threat Actor Research
The Grugq: "Give the man a zero day and he'll have access for a day, teach a man to phish and he'll have access for life"
The Infamous Wu Shu Hackers (IWSH) are an active cyber espionage cellular network who have been very aggressive with regard to the sport of football. The network's activities demonstrate that global espionage relating to corruption in football is the group's primary motive, and not financial gain.
Its main targets are bookmakers, football agents, matchfixing consortia, football clubs, politicians and news media.
We are able to trace IWSH actions back as far as 2010 but there are substantial evidences that the network was initially established in the mid-1990's. We have shared several detailed analyses of IWSH in recent years and this new paper attempts to dissect the network's attacks and methodologies in order to provide governments and relevant business sectors with an updated overview of IWSH's processes and tactics.
Under normal circumstances, we would share defence strategies against IWSH (on a consultative level) but, in our view, there are none. These are not normal circumstances and the speed of evolution and use of black swan tactics disables protocols and options.
The IWSH have become increasingly relevant particularly as they have begun to undertake more than simple football espionage activities. In 2016, the IWSH hacked into several senior figures in the Conservative government (leading to the withdrawal from politics of one senior minister). IWSH also compromised a member of the House of Lords with close links to corruption in football.
The network sought to utilise the information so gained to force through the establishment of a government-linked entity to address corruption in British football.
Moreover, IWSH claim to have evidence that there exists liaisons between mafia and state, orchestrating corruption and matchfixing in association with a global array of other states, governments, sovereign wealth funds, rogue football clubs and wealthy individuals. The impacts of these malicious activities have been felt by various governments and enterprises around the world.
Citizens of different countries are also affected as the IWSH attempts to manipulate opinions about malfeasance in the sport.
The cyber attacks by IWSH might even serve as an example for other entities who might copy tactics and repurpose them for their own proprietary aims.
We have monitored IWSH operations for a decade now and we can perceive how the network has evolved into a 5th Estate media organisation, manipulating events and public opinion via the collection and dissemination of knowledge gained by hacking.
Some exposures e.g. regarding Leicester City's 2015/16 Premier League title victory or the corruption underpinning Liverpool FC's 2019/20 triumph are suggestive of systemic mafia-based behaviours while others e.g. the 'Football Leaks' are examples of criminal activities within turf wars.
The network's cyber propaganda methods - using electronic means to change public opinion - create issues on a hierarchy of levels.
The eruption of fake news in 2017 may in part be attributed to repetitive information leaks and manipulations by malicious actors. Mainstream media sources in Britain e.g. the Telegraph have confirmed that the IWSH offered exclusive snippets of high-impact hacks, presumably in an attempt to alter public perceptions of British football.
In this document, we seek to provide an overview of the IWSH and to explore the variety of attacks being propagated (although it is critical to add that the cellular nature of this network makes a complete analysis impossible). The IWSH are known for sophisticated phishing activities, some zero days, false flag operations and for trespassing on prohibited ground and leaving without a trace - they seek information, not power.
The IWSH are particularly swift at exploiting vulnerabilities caused by infrastructural weaknesses e.g. the insecure communications between mafia, bookmakers, broadcasters and the Premier League over Project Restart during the global pandemic.
Centrally, the IWSH remain a driven cyber espionage network linked to valid anti-corruption networks like Football is Fixed, ANTI (Analytics Networks Transparency Integrity) and Campanile Analytics and to fringe operations like the Edelweiss Pirates, La Brigade de la Surete and Synonymous.
The hackers coordinate multiple attacks via various methods from secured nodes on the same target to achieve their aims. Whereas most hacking entities phish for financial or political gain, the IWSH appear to have no interest in monetising their activities - their initial slogan describes their purpose as "to save football from the mafia".
The IWSH leak sections of their stolen information online but, perhaps surprisingly, would appear to withhold some key breaches. We assume that this is a defensive tactic against any future legal actions that might be brought against the network.
We do not know for certain how much knowledge resides in the network.
In this manner (and in this manner only), IWSH are similar to the Fancy Bears' Hacking Team who revealed doping by US and UK athletes in the Brazil Olympics and the coordinated systemic doping by the Team Sky cycling body.
The IWSH though is not, in our opinion, linked to any one government.
Documents released by the IWSH include the following - collusion between Rangers and the Scottish FA exposed by the 'Charlotte Fakes' hacks, alleged 'mafia state' activities producing systemic matchfixing in the Premier League, the control by rogue football agents of the international matches of England, Scotland, Wales games as well as matches involving the two teams in Ireland, the stealing of documents from European clubs fronted by blackmailer Rui Pinto, the malicious targeting of Arsenal and Manchester City as well as other disclosures outlined elsewhere in this document and appendix.
The IWSH claim to stand for "anti-corruption, fair play and clean sport", however, in reality, they release private information that is, in effect, stolen.
These activities markedly weaken the institutions governing football and are having impacts on betting turnover, television subscriptions, attendances at matches and tax revenues.
In 2016, 'Football Leaks' information was released on the 'Synonymous' blog. We were able to intercept documents Synonymous shared with servers in Kerkyra (Greece), Bucuresti (Romania) and Tiraspol (Transnistria) which revealed that a mafia football agent had orchestrated the physical stealing of documents from major football clubs in Spain, Portugal, France and the Netherlands and that the campaign against financial manipulations and alleged third party ownership (TPO) linked to the Gestifute agency was overseen by a cartel of British football agents who also utilise TPO and who were commercially at war with Gestifute. The IWSH could have shared this information with the Portuguese police but, for reasons that remain unclear, elected not to do so.
Two national newspapers shared with us evidence that clearly link the IWSH to Synonymous.
Between 2008 and 2017, one particular firm of football agents closely associated with this mafia agent were repeatedly hacked by the IWSH. Stolen knowledge was published by the 'Football is Fixed' and 'Synonymous' websites. No individual ever claims responsibility nor the 'fame' that is usually attached to such activities.
The IWSH were able to access password-protected parts of the █████ website via credential phishing campaigns.
The IWSH also attacked both free and corporate webmails, they have gained access to the private betting accounts of individuals (and their proxies) they claim are involved in insider trading and matchfixing.
The IWSH claim to "open markets" in the same manner that Wikileaks "opens governments".
There have been numerous occasions where the IWSH have used mainstream media to publicise their attacks. The Telegraph confirmed that they were offered exclusive access to alleged corruptions over player selection for the England team while the Guardian were offered considerable evidence about the fixing of a Premier League game between Fulham and Wigan Athletic in October 2008. This 'evidence' included phone hacking.
In our professional view, we strongly suspect that the successful hacks undertaken by the IWSH of which we are aware are but a mere fraction of the full extent of the network's activities. Even when we are able to detect intrusions, they have frequently been active for considerable periods prior to detection and very often have already been terminated as a source of further information by the network. Of particular concern is the hacking of private market activities. One of our clients has been made aware that the IWSH have full details of every bet that has been placed since February 2009 (both privately, via proxy and through the Starlizard betting syndicate). The IWSH claim that this proves matchfixing influenced by both controlled referees and by coerced players (particularly goalkeepers) but the group's activities are criminal in that they illegally invade the privacy of this client.
In the Spring of 2016, the IWSH launched phishing warfare against certain senior members of the British government in coincidence with a parallel phishing campaign targeting two European free webmail providers. It is not known to what degree the network were successful but knowledge shared with a doubled operator by the group suggests that some vital information was gathered and the network publicly proclaimed that "systemic corruptions allowed by the deep state in relation to the Premier League triumph of Leicester City has yielded £24 billion profit for a global matchfixing syndicate in one season".
No further evidences have been made public yet but, in some instances, the IWSH will wait a decade or more to publish information to the media (as shown by the group's recent revelations relating to Brighton and Hove Albion owner Tony Bloom, some of which dated back to 1995).
The IWSH never doctor the information that they publicise and we are not able to find any evidence that the group benefits in the betting markets from the insider trading information that they steal. The authenticity of all leaked data is robustly verified. By publishing carefully selected undoctored output, such threat actors are more effective in influencing fan opinion in a manner that aligns with the group's mission statement.
Phishing is a valuable weapon in espionage campaigns. Professional hackers create ingenious social engineering tactics and avoid spam filters and any security installed on the target systems. Huge amounts of valuable data can be stolen via phishing and such campaigns frequently create a foundation for future warfare. The IWSH has utilised phishing to silently gather knowledge and data over long time windows and continues to use this penetration to delve further into the substance of the victim organisation e.g. by sending emails from stolen / shared identities.
It is very likely that, throughout his tenure as England manager, the email accounts of Roy Hodgson were compromised and that other actors were impacted by association.
The IWSH has conducted numerous long-running campaigns against certain high profile entities via the hacking of free international webmail providers, minor webmail entities in fringe territories and proprietary internal systems - we know of no other methods that might have revealed to the network the scores of aliases used by one particular matchfixer.
IWSH have a full house.
We have attempted to detect patterns in the activities of IWSH particularly with regard to the timing of attacks but the network appears to be incorporating random number generators buried deep in their highly developed global network in soliciting attacks.
On other occasions, IWSH will always react to particular news events in football claiming to offset the 'fake' mainstream media news with 'reality' claiming that all mainstream output is 'hyperreal'.
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Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy
Colonel Ardant Du Picq: "For me, as a soldier, the smallest detail caught on the spot and in the heat of action is more instructive than all the Thiers and Jominis in the world"
The IWSH was particularly effective during the windows of lockdown due to the covid-19 pandemic. Most bodies allowed members and employees to read emails away from the office, enhancing business efficiency but introducing significant cybersecurity risks. Such webmail may be hacked in numerous manners. Aside from the utilisation of phishing lures that are indistinguishable from the websites being mimicked, the IWSH have also been known to target tabnabbing prompts to re-enter personal passwords, the abuse of Open Authentication standards, two-factor authentication via secondary phishing, virtual private network hacking and, in our estimation, only hidden security keys and biometric protection offset these modes of attack.
Unfortunately, phishing is but one tool in the IWSH armoury.
Another method that we know the IWSH utilise is the compromising of mail servers to direct to a server in another territory (in the case of IWSH, Tiraspol in Transnistria). These attacks are obvious and quickly remedied but serve to demonstrate the mockery that seems to underpin all hacking groups. While this type of infringement is simple in nature, the outcomes may still be devastating as Clifford Stoll demonstrated in his book "The Cuckoo's Egg". Further complications are added with this type of attack as phone hacking is sometimes perpetrated in parallel.
The IWSH appear to curtail their activities around the movable date of Chinese New Year. We can only surmise that either the IWSH are linked to South East Asian entities or that the market structures relating to matchfixing alters in this window. Of course, it might also be the case that the network simply changes tack in these windows. We cannot know with any certainty. The group are also significantly less active in the close season of the major European leagues but, again, it may be that IWSH shift their focus to the summer leagues of Scandinavia and, most likely, Ireland.
Of late, we have seen some evidence that the IWSH have turned to spear-phishing campaigns against lower level figures in target organisations. Emails are received about key news or current events directly associated with the business of the organisation directly mimicking headlines from mainstream media entities. While it is easy to block these attacks against high profile individuals, weaknesses lower down the hierarchy are exploited by the IWSH particularly with regard to the Premier League Project Restart during lockdown in 2020.
And senior figures have also been spear-phished after being caught off guard during the initial window of the covid-19 pandemic.
The IWSH is extremely careful with how they infect their targets. Initially the exploit URLs are specific to each victim, each with 'code' which is unique to that target. Invasive Javascript code then uploads information to the exploit server. Depending on the target, the exploit will return an old exploit, a zero day or a social engineering temptation. The key inputs here for IWSH are the maintenance of the zero day and the avoidance of detection. Even if detection occurs, waves of malicious activity might result from just-patched Flash zero day and open Windows privilege escalation vulnerability. The IWSH frequently infect with a lower grade of malware to determine whether the target is worthy of further investigation prior to hitting valuable entities with X-Tunnel or X-Agent or proprietary IWSH constructs beyond the horizons of our current focus.
The war strategy is to control as many of the nodes of the target network as possible.
So-called watering hole attacks are also a part of the IWSH armoury. Sites are compromised that IWSH suspect will be visited by their target (particularly betting companies and data sources). In one case, the IWSH injected a Browser Exploitation Framework exploit onto a football agent and this attack proved to be highly successful - there was a whole toolkit of exploits unleashed. There are parallels here with IWSH tabnabbing strategies.
There were historical windows where the IWSH refused to use zero days - we do not know why.
Like all hacking groups, the IWSH exhibit preferences for certain webhosting providers and this has allowed us to spot some attacks swiftly but the network always appear one step ahead with an exponentially increasing network of IP addresses being used, many activated remotely via seemingly impenetrable nodes.
Although IWSH uses the infrastructure of well-developed territories e.g. Britain, Romania and Australia, the intelligence services are known to have struggled to break random number generated encryption and transport layer security. Some success was achieved in December 2016 via the hacking of several phones used by the network but each device became a discarded burner within hours. The IWSH evidently does not care that intelligence services might be exposed via the release of the identities of targeted individuals.
At this point we need to address the unknown unknowns. The IWSH functions as a cellular network, claiming that it takes a network to defeat a network. Only one member of the IWSH has been infiltrated and this actor is aware of our interest which makes it difficult to determine how much of the output that is disclosed to us is real and how much is internal IWSH disinformation. We have not been able to locate any of the 'offices' that the network utilise in Greece, Romania, Australia or Transnistria. We achieved an iota of success via weaknesses in the Bucuresti node but we cannot be sure that what we have gained hasn't been gamed by the IWSH - the mirror gathering global data in Romania appears to operate from a bank.
We are in the arena of doubled and trebled games here and we suggest that state actors explore these tactics of espionage.
We repeatedly find ourselves unable to confirm the exact infection chains with IWSH and we frequently judge that we are being led by the nose up cul-de-sacs.
Whereas some hacker groups demand publicity for the operatives involved, the IWSH regards itself primarily as a security network - we are only able to hazard a guess at the total number of individuals in the network, for example. For most cyber networks at least some nicknames are determined from hacking sites and conferences, but not so with the IWSH. The identities of the individual IWSH actors are extremely well protected. There may indeed be some breaches that are linked to IWSH but are never so attributed - football espionage is a growth sector due to the sheer volume of the betting markets on major games where single trades can resonate around £100 million.
We suspect that IWSH uses Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to further layer disguises on their operation as well as seeking out webhosting providers that allow heightened levels of privacy for clients. We suspect that IWSH pay a premium for such anonymity. But, beyond this, just a couple of proxy nodes markedly increases security for hacking groups and the IWSH is probably using many more than two nodes.
In the period since 2016, certain intelligence services have taken a keen interest in the IWSH - issues relating to espionage must be addressed at higher political levels than the police. Actors like IWSH benefit from the lack of cooperation between different security and enforcement agencies and the time delays so created are exploited by nimble operations like IWSH.
Normal cybercriminals suspend strategies if detected whereas the IWSH don't even break stride - it is almost as if they gain energy from setbacks and detection.
Some lateral thinkers have even projected that these detections are part of a deliberate deeper IWSH strategy.
The majority of the campaigns undertaken by the IWSH would be of interest to intelligence services globally. Investigations by the police have led nowhere as espionage can only be addressed at state level as communications between law enforcement bodies are rarely optimal. And the IWSH repeatedly push against the surfaces and boundaries that the state has attempted to set.
Protecting yourself against an aggressive attacker like IWSH is a major challenge. They are able to run campaigns over decades and the lack of focus on profit shields them from prying eyes. The network contains market analysts and trading tactics are exported into IWSH strategy - so just as historical information is only of value fractally in assessing a current and / or future market price, historical attack strategies are rarely repeated as the IWSH develop unique strategies for each and every new campaign, sometimes even delaying such campaigns until a robust plan has been energised.
Operational security is evidently more critical thinking than critical timing.
For similar reasons, there has been no success in running machine learning techniques at the IWSH - they deliberately develop black swan realities outside the scope of any artificial intelligence.
Where the IWSH differ from many hacking entities is in their utilisation of WiFi Penetration Tools (PTs). Although some of these packages are top down and malicious to ensnare gullible hackers, IWSH appear to be able to counterfeit the code and re-energise as a proprietary tool. The key aspect of PTs is that by hacking WiFi connections with AirSnort, Aircrack, Kismet, Cain and Abel, CommView or WireShark, the IWSH are able to crack keys and decrypt, undertake network detection (including hidden networks) as well as password and packet sniffing. In particular, Cain and Abel allows IWSH to recover passwords by sniffing the network, cracking encryption passwords using brute-force, plus cryptoanalysis attacks, dictionary and other more obtuse (and unknown) strategies. Cain and Abel might also recover wireless network keys by analysing routing protocols.
Although outside the remit of this report, we should also bring your attention to a structural weakness exploited repeatedly by IWSH. Most of their targets are geographically on the move throughout their lives and the architectural weaknesses in infrastructure in certain territories allows hackers to enter domains more easily. Everybody needs to address this issue, which we will cover in a future consultancy.
And do not even consider that the maintenance of a network air gap will keep you safe.
Another tactic that has revealed much to the IWSH is the employment of shotgun microphones at live sporting events. We have seen evidences that IWSH have recorded communications between referees and their junior officials and, more pertinently, with the Premier League Match Centre (which was not even supposed to exist at the time of the recordings). Equally alarmingly, these microphones have been aimed at Directors' Boxes and VIP enclosures with outcomes that can only be guessed at.
The Premier League Match Centre was a forerunner of the Video Assistant Referee (VAR) Centre at Stockley Park. If the IWSH have been successful in maliciously hacking Stockley Park, the Premier League brand is in trouble.
In conclusion, the IWSH claim to utilise Divine Skein in their attacks - these attacks are coordinated from multiple loci and successful defence must be absolute as these hackers only need one attack to succeed to achieve full intrusion. Even when protected by minimising attack surfaces, creating corporate VPN, limiting the number of domain names, two-step registration, careful vetting of outsourced services and educating people in security at all levels in the hierarchy, any failure, weakness, loophole will be exploited ruthlessly.
And corruption grows into new shapes.
Even IWSH enemies now copy IWSH tactics as shown by the methods utilised by Liverpool FC to 'hack' into Manchester City Analytics using rogue insiders and shared passwords from a war room at Anfield.
Manchester City have still not resolved these issues.
Football is war.
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Eavan Boland:
They, like all creatures, being made
For the shovel and the worm
Ransacked their perishable minds and found
Pattern and form
And with their own hands quarried from hard words
A figure in which secret things confide
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© 2023 Football is Fixed
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